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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

August 20, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: OCB Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems

SUBJECT: USIA paper on "Suggested U. S. Initiatives For Exchange of Visits Period"

The subject paper will be discussed at the meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems today (August 20).

A copy is attached.

*M. H. Williams*  
Manning H. Williams  
OCB Staff Representative

Attachment: Subject paper

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Suggested U. S. Initiatives For Exchange of Visits Period \*

The exchange of visits between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev will provide a number of opportunities for the United States to take initiatives which may exert some influence on Mr. Khrushchev and on future courses of Soviet action. It also will provide the U. S. with opportunities to register a positive impact upon third countries or, in some cases, to dispel apprehensions in such countries. It is in the U. S. interest to take those initiatives which will enable it to make the most of these extraordinary opportunities.

The psychological sphere is only one of the major subject areas in which suitable initiatives might be considered. Contemplated initiatives must, of course, be weighed with due regard to other major concerns such as European security, disarmament and trade. However, because negotiations, particularly those affecting the interests of third countries, have been precluded from these exchanges, initiatives during this period may well have to be confined primarily to the psychological sphere, and more particularly to the area of greater communication, understanding, and openness between the two countries. Any initiative that may be taken in other fields (such as trade) will, of course, also have important psychological implications.

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\* USIA working level paper submitted to Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems - August 20, 1959.

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The objectives of initiatives in the psychological sphere would be:

1. To make constructive proposals in the field which (a) has been designated on both sides and in third countries as the primary purpose of the exchange, that of greater communication and understanding between major powers, (b) is the area of some likelihood of accord between the two blocs in the immediate future, and (c) is most likely to lead to greater progress toward agreement on other issues affecting the peace of the world.
2. To make challenges in the field of openness, in which we are strong, thereby demonstrating to third countries (a) that the U. S. is confident in its strength and in the future, as manifested by its openness policies, and (b) that the U.S. purpose in increasing exchanges with the USSR is to expose both the Soviet leaders and people to understanding of Free World policies and realities essential to prevent Soviet miscalculations.
3. To take the initiative from Premier Khrushchev for some periods of his visit, during which all attention is bound to be focussed on his statements and actions, and to counter possible Khrushchev initiatives. Proposals should be reasonable and appropriate to the context of the visits so that they will not be labelled propaganda and cannot be termed violations of the spirit of the exchange.
4. To influence Premier Khrushchev to take measures which, directly or indirectly, would increase the probability of some positive impact on

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Soviet society by outside forces, tending to increase the pace of evolutionary change in the USSR. The proposals made by the U. S. should be realistic and feasible. They should be of such a nature, and they should be so timed and presented, as not to make the Soviet leader feel that the U. S. seeks to alter the basic character of his regime.

The proposals listed here would, of course, have to be worked out in greater detail, as would their timing and manner of presentation. It may be desirable to develop a timetable which would maintain the pressure on the openness theme not only during the visits but for a considerable period thereafter.

The suggested initiatives follow:

A. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

The President should announce a unilateral lifting of restrictions on travel in the U. S. by Soviet citizens, either with an announced time limit or for an indefinite period during which the Soviets might come forth with a reciprocal lifting of travel restrictions in the USSR. It might be appropriate to take this initiative at some point during Khrushchev's visit to the U. S. in order to create an opportunity for him to emulate us. If the Soviet side does not reciprocate, our action will at least underscore the basic openness of our society in contrast to the closed Soviet society.

B. EISENHOWER - KHRUSHCHEV RADIO-TV APPEARANCES

The President should suggest his willingness to try to arrange with American radio and television networks for Khrushchev to address

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the American public on a regular basis---perhaps quarterly---in return for the privilege of addressing the Soviet public himself on a like basis. The suggestion might most logically be made at the time of his final appearance on Soviet radio and TV, when he could note the fact that he and Khrushchev had already had in effect one exchange of broadcasts and refer naturally to the desirability of a continuation of that pattern. If the proposal seems to have some chance of acceptance, reciprocity of coverage will have to be worked out.

#### C. COMMUNITY EXCHANGES

The mayor and other civic leaders of the cities Khrushchev is scheduled to visit should be encouraged to express to him publicly their desire to institute an exchange of representatives of various facets of community life on a city-to-city basis.

#### D. TOURISM

In one of his public appearances in the Soviet Union the President should stress the desire of the U.S. to receive ever greater numbers of Soviet tourists, tendering a warm invitation to the Soviet population to come to see America for themselves. Appropriately-phrased reference should be made to the disparity between the numbers of tourists visiting the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Since the Vice President has already made statements along these lines, the President's comments on the subject would be more effective if accompanied by announcements that we are prepared to take some specific steps to further this objective.

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#### E. EXCHANGE OF FILMS ON THE VISITS

It is proposed that color films on (1) Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the U. S. and (2) President Eisenhower's visit to the USSR be exchanged for reciprocal showing in the two countries. USIA is already planning to prepare a 30-minute color film which may be used for this exchange.

#### F. JAMMING

The President should seek opportunities, both public and private, to influence Mr. Khrushchev to give favorable consideration to termination of Soviet jamming of VOA broadcasts directed to the USSR. Such an initiative could be tied in logically to the President's conviction that a freer exchange of information is essential to increasing understanding between peoples, and therefore to creating a meaningful peace.

If the subject of jamming is to be raised at Camp David, it would be desirable to arrange for the President to tune in on an English-language broadcast of Moscow Radio in order to demonstrate to Khrushchev that these broadcasts can be received regularly without jamming.

#### G. EXCHANGE OF NATIONAL EXHIBITIONS

The President should propose, either to Mr. Khrushchev here or in a public statement in the USSR, another exchange of national exhibitions in 1961.

#### H. STUDENT EXCHANGES

A determination previously having been made of the maximum number of Soviet students that could be absorbed by American higher

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educational institutions, the President should make a concrete offer to accept additional Soviet students up to that specified number. At the same time, the President should indicate steps he is prepared to take to facilitate the study in the USSR of as many American students as the USSR is willing to accept. This formula would make possible an increased flow of students in both directions without the obstacles created by insistence on exact numerical reciprocity.

I. SPACE COOPERATION

Concrete implementation should be given during Mr. Khrushchev's visit to Mr. Nixon's Moscow proposal on going to the moon together. This should take the form of some U.S. initiative for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the space field, such as a proposal for a mutual exchange of instrumentation to be sent aloft in our respective space programs. The proposal should reflect both the U.S. will for peaceful cooperation and the openness which characterizes U.S. policies and American society.

J. UN INFORMATION IN THE USSR

Consideration should be given to the use of the occasion of Khrushchev's address to the UN for the purpose of urging fuller Soviet cooperation in the dissemination in the USSR of information from and about the UN.

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NOTE: Soviet acceptance of the following two proposals would create two significant openings for reaching the Soviet public. While it is planned

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to discuss these items during the forthcoming negotiations on exchanges with the USSR, the chances of Soviet acceptance through negotiations alone are poor. Therefore, we recommend that the President take them up personally with Mr. Khrushchev:

K. READING ROOMS

The President should propose the opening of reading rooms on a reciprocal basis, with a reading room in Washington, D. C., under Soviet direction and a reading room in Moscow under American direction. These reading rooms would include books and publications on science, industry and culture, as well as motion pictures, small exhibits, and musical recordings. The reading rooms would be open without restriction to the citizens of the two countries.

L. SALE OF PUBLICATIONS

The President should propose to Mr. Khrushchev that the USSR establish public outlets for American publications similar to the numerous commercial outlets for Soviet publications in the U. S. In this connection it is suggested that Mr. Khrushchev be invited to visit an outlet for Soviet publications in the United States (e. g., Victor Kamkin in Washington, or one of the Four Continents outlets in New York City).

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